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Abstract
We introduce the notion of preliminary voting, or pre-voting, wherein
a voter deposits—perhaps over the Internet—a preliminary vote or pre-
vote with election authorities at some time before the close of elections.
Prevotes are not official votes, and need not be kept private; indeed, elec-
tion officials might, as a matter of announced policy, publish the list of
received prevotes together with the names of the voters submitting such
prevotes. With prevoting, a voter must visit a polling site to make any
final adjustments to his prevote in private, and to actually cast her (per-
haps modified) prevote.
1 Introduction
There are many different voting technologies and procedures in use today[4].
This variety seems to be increasing, due to technological change, a desire to
better serve all voters, security considerations, and a need to support more
complex elections.
In this note, we introduce another voting procedure, called preliminary vot-
ing or pre-voting, and consider its advantages and disadvantages. In sum, we
consider pre-voting to be a promising direction for future voting system evo-
lution. In particular, pre-voting seems to be one way to obtain some or most
of the potential advantages of “voting over the Internet” without incurring the
serious security problems of actually “voting over the Internet.”
2 Prevoting Scenario
We give a scenario to illustrate how prevoting might work in a typical situation.
We divide this scenario into three parts: setup—where the voter obtains initial
information about the election and how to prevote, prevoting—where the voter
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actually composes and submits her prevote, and voting—where the voter goes
to the polling site to privately retrieve her prevote, possibly modify it, and cast
it.
The scenario as given here is only meant to be illustrative of the prevoting
framework; there are obviously many variations possible on this theme.
2.1 Setup
Suppose Alice is already registered to vote in Middlesex county in Massa-
chusetts.
One month before the election, Alice receives in the mail a letter from the
Middlesex election officials informing her of:
• the date of the election,
• the address of the precinct polling place (her town hall) where she should
cast her vote, together with a map of how to get there,
• the issues, races, and candidates on the ballot,
• her prevoting password, should she wish to prevote, and
• the URL of a state-maintained web site where she may prevote.
The letter also contains a paper prevoting ballot and envelope, since Alice’s
county supports prevoting both over the Internet and with paper ballots. If
Alice will be unable to vote at her polling place on Election Day, she may use
the prevoting ballot as an absentee ballot.
If Alice does not wish to prevote, then she appears at the polling place on
election day (or earlier, if the election officials permit “early voting”) and votes
“as usual,” using whatever voting equipment is provided there.
2.2 Prevoting
Alice, well-known to be a bit of a geek, decides to “prevote” over the Internet.
She could have also prevoted using the supplied paper ballot, but she would
have had to mail that in at least two weeks before the election, and by the time
she wanted to prevote, that deadline had passed.
Using her home computer, she logs in to the Massachusetts state prevoting
web site prevote.ma.us, and logs in with her name, address, and the prevoting
password from her letter.
The election is fairly long, but Alice works conscientiously to decide what
her choices are for each issue and race. Part-way through, however, she is
interrupted, so she logs off. Her prevoting session, only partially finished, is
saved.
The next day, Alice finishes prevoting during her lunch break at work, using
her office desktop. She clicks on the “submit prevote” button, and her prevote
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is submitted. She is well ahead of the “cutoff” 24 hours prior to the start of
Election Day, after which no more Internet prevotes may be submitted.
Her prevote, when submitted, is also immediately posted on the state pre-
voting web-site www.prevote.ma.us, together with her name and address. She
could have kept her prevote from being posted on the web site by selecting the
“Keep prevote private” button, but she’s proud of her voting choices, and is
happy to have others see how she prevotes.
She also prints out a one-page prevote receipt which gives all of her prevoting
choices both in English and in two-dimensional machine-readable bar code.
With the election only three days away, no one talks about anything else,
and Alice’s posted prevoting choices cause some interesting discussion at work.
Alice had prevoted in favor of mandatory dog muzzles, and Alice’s dog-loving
colleagues argue that this proposition is too extreme. Alice is convinced. Al-
though she doesn’t actually need to change her prevote, she does so (by logging
in again to the state prevoting web site) to show her new position against
mandatory dog muzzling.
Alice’s boss Howard sees Alice’s prevote in favor of raising taxes on gasoline,
and tries to convince her to vote against this proposition. Howard has a long
commute to work, and this proposition will be expensive for him if it passes.
Alice listens respectfully to his arguments, but isn’t really convinced. She says,
“You make many good points, and I’ll need to think about them. I may vote as
you recommend on Election Day.” Had she felt more awkward or intimidated
by her boss, she might have changed her prevote, or perhaps kept her prevote
private in the first place. But in any case, she still intends to vote in favor of
higher gas taxes on Election Day.
The prevotes (public or private) are tallied daily by the state election officials,
and the tallies are published. Some industries that are potentially affected by
increase gas taxes see that Massachusetts may well pass the proposition in favor
of higher gasoline taxes, and they run a strong ad campaign against such taxes.
2.3 Voting
On Election Day, Alice goes to her precinct to actually cast her vote. She
identifies herself to the election official, and is shown to a voting booth.
She gets her prevote up on the screen by entering her prevoting password
(each voter has a distinct prevoting password). She could instead have waved
her prevote receipt barcode under the scanner next to the voting machine.
She reviews her choices one more time, and decides not to make any further
changes. She thinks a bit about whether the proposed gas tax might be too
high, but decides that the need for additional education funds is just too great,
and leaves her prevote unchanged.
She then presses the “cast vote” button, and her (in this case, unmodified)
prevote now becomes her official cast vote. The voting machine prints out a
paper record of her vote, which she also checks over and approves. The paper
record then drops into the ballot box.
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Her whole voting process at the polling site takes under one minute. There
are no lines at the poll site. Alice is happy that she was able, on the one hand,
to leisurely compose her ballot in the relative quiet and comfort of her home
and office environments, and on the other hand to be able to officially cast her
vote at the town hall so quickly.
3 Discussion
We show how prevoting relates to issues and requirements facing voting systems.
For a fuller treatment of voting system requirements, see [4].
3.1 Voter Privacy
A good voting system will enforce voter privacy, so that no one but the voter
herself will know for sure how she voted. This important requirement prevents
voters from being coerced or bribed.
As an aside, we note that absentee voting does not provide any good way to
prevent a voter from selling her vote. This is a strong argument why one may
wish to prohibit absentee or mail-in voting as a routine procedure, or as merely
a matter of voter convenience. Of course, it may be appropriate or necessary to
allow a voter to vote absentee when it is the only way possible for her to cast
her vote. But even then, “early voting” seems generally a better approach to
this problem.
With a prevoting system, Alice can change her mind as she casts her vote
at the polling site. No one can know how Alice actually votes. Voter privacy is
preserved. Alice can’t “sell her vote” even if she should want to.
The posting of prevotes does not violate voter privacy, since Alice’s prevote
and her actual cast vote need not be the same, or even related. Alice might
claim to be a Democrat, but actually be a “closet Republican.” Her prevotes
look very Democratic, but her actual votes could be otherwise.
3.2 Compatibility
The notion of prevoting is compatible in principle with almost any current
voting system; the only requirement is that the voting system must be able (or
modified to be able) to support a fast way of “pre-loading” a voter’s choices from
the database of submitted prevotes or from a bar-code scanner, for subsequent
review, modification, and casting by the voter.
Prevoting is orthogonal and independent of such issues as voter-verified pa-
per trails.
There is some small interaction between prevoting and early voting: if a voter
prevotes and then decides to cast her vote early, the prevote must obviously have
been received at the polling site by the time she goes to vote early. If not, the
voter will have to compose and cast her vote “from scratch” at the polling site
for her early vote.
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A voter who submits a prevote is perhaps less likely to require a provisional
ballot, since the prevoting process provides an additional opportunity to check
that the voter is on the registration rolls and to inform her of where she should
go on Election Day to cast her vote.
3.3 Long Lines and Efficiency
One of the common complaints during the 2004 US presidential election was that
there were excessively long lines at many precincts [3]. Many voting districts
had purchased new voting equipment, and had apparently bought (or were
allocated) too few. Many voters waited long hours in lines; others, unable to
wait so long, gave up and were effectively disenfranchised.
Prevoting helps greatly with this problem, since voting at the poll site be-
comes dramatically more efficient, especially when the ballot is long. A typical
prevoting voter has already specified her choices before going to the polls; all
she needs to do at the polling site is to confirm them, making in private any
last minute changes she wishes.
3.4 Cost
Because of the efficiency of a prevoting system, voting districts may greatly
reduce their budget for voting systems.
With today’s electronic voting system, a typical voting machine may service
200-300 voters. A prevoting system may double or triple that. Equipment costs
may be cut in half.
3.5 Auditing and Exit Polls
Prevoting also serves a very valuable role in auditing the correctness and in-
tegrity of the voting system. Although a tally of the prevotes does not need to
equal a tally of the corresponding votes, one expects these results to be close.
Major discrepancies may be cause for a manual recount of the paper audit trail
of the cast votes.
3.6 Absentee, Mail-in, and Internet voting
Although many have proposed, and are even testing, voting over the Internet,
there are significant, even fatal, problems with doing so. (Consider the recent
very negative evaluation [2] of the SERVE project, which proposed Internet
voting for overseas military personnel; this project was subsequently cancelled.)
Prevoting over the Internet may be as close as one can reasonably get to
“Internet voting,” while adhering to the requirements of a good voting system
(most notably, voter privacy, reliability, and security).
If prevoting over the Internet is adopted, there will be those who propose
that the final polling-site visit could be skipped, and that the electronic prevotes
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should automatically become cast votes if the voter doesn’t show up to officially
review, modify, and cast their votes at the polling site.
We feel strongly that such a proposal should be rejected.
This proposal would turn prevoting into true remote Internet voting, which
has a multitude of very real and very serious problems [5, 1].
One might argue a bit differently for paper prevotes, since they are so very
close to paper absentee ballots. If a voter casts a paper prevote, shouldn’t it
become a proper cast absentee vote if the voter doesn’t show up on Election
Day?
One might see this as more reasonable, given our current policies on paper
absentee ballots. But we do feel, as noted above, that absentee voting should
be restricted for use only in cases of necessity, not just for voter convenience.
(Washington and Oregon notwithstanding.)
3.7 Accessibility
A prevoting system may also be more supportive of voters with special re-
quirements, since a large fraction of the interaction can take place at home or
somewhere with necessary special prevoting support.
3.8 Barcoded prevotes
Part of the prevoting proposal made here is that prevotes should be printed
out and given to the voters, and that such printed prevotes should be machine
readable at the polling site. This allows the voter, using a scanner, to very
quickly load the voting machine with her prevote.
3.9 Pre-printed prevote ballots
This idea of being able to quickly load the voting machine with a prevote has
other interesting positive implications and ramifications.
One could imagine political parties and other organizations printing up and
distributing “recommended prevotes” that voters may take into the polling site.
These are somewhat like printed crib sheets used today, or the printed ballots
of long ago, except that they are now machine readable and are not final ballots
to be deposited, only prevotes.
Voter privacy is preserved, since the voter can change any of the recommen-
dations on the prevote once she is in the voting both.
The only downside to such a practice is that there may be an increased
number of voters whose prevotes do not get submitted before Election Day to
the election authorities, which degrades the utility of the submitted prevotes as
a check on the integrity of the voting system.
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3.10 Openness and Democracy
The public character of submitted prevotes may also help our democratic insti-
tutions. It encourages debate, while preserving the essential requirement that
each voter’s actual vote should remain private.
4 Conclusions
The notion of preliminary voting or prevoting, as proposed here, while adhering
to standard voting system requirements regarding voter privacy, seems promis-
ing to make voting more convenient, trustworthy, and cost-effective.
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